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Optimizing Strategy in Agent-Based Automated
Negotiation
Jörg Meyer, Torsten Eymann
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

Abstract: Digital Business Agents (DBAs) can assist human buyers and sellers in
electronic markets by strategically conducting automated negotiation to minimize
transaction costs. However, the resulting information systems are complex
environments, which are hard to assess analytically. The DBAs’ strategies will
thus need to incorporate heuristics, which adapt to ever changing environment
conditions using machine learning algorithms. This article compares the
performance of an evolutionary algorithm, numeric optimization methods and a
hybrid, economics-based mechanism, using the electronic market setting of the
multiagent system AVALANCHE as an example.
Keywords: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Machine Learning, Adaptive
Strategies, Automated Negotiation

1

Why automated negotiation strategies have to
adapt

Digital Business Agents (DBAs) [Dieb01; Eyma03] can assist human buyers and
sellers in digital business processes and environments to save transaction costs.
They monitor other agents and the environment continuously, e.g. by making price
comparisons between different suppliers in the on- and offline world [Youl+00], in
order to fulfil their design goal of utility maximization for their human owner.
They will be able to enter into negotiation with many potential trade partners at
once, reaching an acceptable deal and setting up a contract in a matter of
milliseconds [Prei98].
If transactions are conducted in the background without the need for human
intervention, the resulting concept can be called Silent Commerce [Adam+03;
Sche00]. Example applications for Silent Commerce are the networked laser
printer which automatically buys toner when needed [Cros00], the mobile fare
payment when entering the train using PDA or mobile phone, the payment of web
services by networked clients in the Grid [Arda+02] or built-to-order adaptive
supply chain control concepts using software agents [Livi01]. The large number of
devices and software objects, the resulting exponential number of possible
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interactions and the possible global reach of communications makes controlling
such systems by means of a centralized coordinator instance unwieldy, if not
impossible. If devices and software can be personalized by the respective human
user, the DBAs will finally act self-interested to maximize the utility of their
human principal [RaJa99] and thus protect utility function and decision process
from outside access.
Personalization requires the human principals of the software agents to define
economic goals, preferences and strategies in computer processable data structures
[Krau97]. In automated negotiation by software agents, the strategies of the
internal model calculate offer prices to propose to a trade negotiations opponent,
in order to achieve a maximum utility gain. The strategy decision is based on
information from sensors, mostly price offers from other agents or institutions in
the market. The price offer sent to the opponent is an effector, which has the
intention to draw the opponent towards a favourable negotiation goal.
The strategy model itself can be based on rule-based, argumentative, gametheoretic or heuristic-adaptive approaches [Jenn+01; Krau97]. The choice of
strategy type depends largely on the characteristics of the problem domain. An
agent-based silent commerce scenario with direct interaction constitutes a nonaccessible, partly deterministic, discrete, highly dynamic and non-episodic
environment [RuNo95]:
• Not accessible: Accessibility denotes the ability of the agent to assess the
complete state of the environment by using sensory input. In the scenarios
considered here, the agent frequently receives both unsolicited information and
concrete responses to offers. However, it is not possible to get insights into the
internal decision processes of other agents. In total, the agent’s world model is
made up of historic, sporadic and infrequent information.
• Partly deterministic: The use of a common negotiation protocol leads to
deterministic states of the negotiation under predictable conditions. However,
the behaviour of the negotiation opponents in response to a particular offer is
not predictable and can comprise a large, potentially infinite number of
possible actions.
• Discrete: The possible actions of a negotiating agent are limited to choosing a
price from the set of the natural numbers or terminating the negotiation by
either acceptance or rejection.
• Dynamic: The internal model and thus the strategy of the negotiators may
change both during and between negotiations using adaptive mechanisms. It is
not predictable whether the response of an opponent will be equal to earlier
responses when facing the same negotiation situation.
• Non-Episodic: Successive negotiations are linked by budget restraints and
feedback propagation of success or failure of the current action decision set,
even if the negotiations can be considered independent otherwise. In particular,
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the outcome of a single negotiation depends only on the choice of strategy
parameter set at the beginning of the negotiation process.
In such a complex, unpredictable environment with possibly thousands of acting
and negotiating agents, rule-based or game-theoretic strategies alone are
considered to be not realistically applicable [Krau97]. However, it is possible to
devise heuristics with some economic background e.g. on reputation and cheating
of opponents [Pado01], or common market and negotiation behaviour [Sack02].
However, these heuristics are geared toward the present situation of the
environment. Their ability to maximize utility will decrease as the environment
changes over time. This leads to the necessity to enhance heuristics with
adaptation capabilities:
"In future applications in e-commerce, multi agent systems will need to be much
more open-ended and dynamic [...]. In particular it is important for the negotiating
agents to be able to adapt their strategies to deal with changing opponents,
changing topics and concerns, and changing user profiles." [Gerd+00]
But whether heuristic-adaptive strategies produce meaningful results depends on
the specifics of both heuristics and adaptation mechanism. This article tries to
show how different existing machine learning algorithms perform in a multiagent
system of DBAs, using the same heuristics as a basis for adaptation.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Chapter 2 briefly illustrates
an agent-based electronic marketplace, where agents with heuristic-adaptive
strategies autonomously negotiate about goods. The following chapters shows the
application of different adaptation mechanisms. Chapter 3 deals with the
implementation of a genetic algorithm. In chapter 4 several numeric optimizing
methods are applied. Chapter 5 presents a hybrid approach following the VID
model according to Brenner [Bren96]. The paper ends with a summary of the
findings.

2

Automated negotiation in AVALANCHE

The AVALANCHE multiagent system has been developed at the University of
Freiburg for several years as a software project where Digital Business Agents
(DBAs) act on electronic marketplaces [Eyma00]. AVALANCHE, as described here,
is realized in JAVA 1.3 with the support of the agent middleware LARS 2.5 CE
[Livi01]. All agents are independent JAVA threads. The system architecture
consists of three basic classes: marketplaces, agents, and one experiment control
object. For the experiments, all agents are initialized simultaneously from the
same JAVA class, using the same initial heuristic parameter values.
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The agent class defines communication abilities and negotiation protocols. Each
agent communicates with every other object on the marketplace in direct, bilateral
and unmediated fashion, using a unique identity. The marketplace merely serves
as a passive white board, where the agent can sign in and out with name and the
type of goods it demands or offers. In particular, the marketplace does not
explicitly synchronize or schedule the agents’ activities.
In the scenario described here, three different types of DBAs are implemented.
Producers and consumers define a seller or buyer strategy, respectively. The
middlemen in-between buy a material good from the producer and sell a product
good to the consumer. The middlemen’s production function just simulates the
conversion of one piece of material to one product. The goods itself are defined as
commodities, so the one-dimensional negotiation variable is the price.
This also allows to represent the utility function N of the AVALANCHE agents
using price notions only. The economic goal in negotiation (neglecting e.g.
production costs) is to maximize profit by increasing the price spread between
selling output goods π V ,i and buying input goods π K ,i in a given time span [t − 1; t ] :
t

t

t −1

t −1

N t = ∑ π V ,i − ∑ π K ,i → MAX

(1)

The performance of the utility function is thus only dependent of the outcome of
the negotiations on both sides (or on one side for the producers and consumers).
The better the negotiation strategy succeeds in comparison with the opponents and
the competitors, the better the agent performs overall. However, if the negotiation
strategies are very similar and unchanging, no agent will be able to achieve
competitive advantage, and the prices and profits will reach a common plateau for
all agents (cf. [Eyma01a; Eyma03].

2.1

The negotiation protocol

All agents follow the same bilateral negotiation protocol as shown in Figure 1.
The buyer agent initiates a negotiation by proposing a seller, whose address was
obtained from reading the white board, sending a propose message containing the
sender A’s identity, the receiver B’s identity and the particular offer price x.
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Figure 1: Course of a negotiation between two agents A and B

The receiver B has now the choice between downright accepting the price, making
a counter-offer, or refusing to further negotiate at all. Whether the state transaction
from state a to either states b (propose), c (accept), or i (refuse) is executed,
depends on the action decision made in the agent’s internal model. This decision is
computed using the heuristic-adaptive strategy outlined below. The software
agents negotiate with each other using a monotonic concession protocol [RoZl94],
where propose and counter-propose messages with subsequent price concessions
are exchanged. The negotiation continues until either a deal has been landed
(state g) or one of the agents has unilaterally decided to refuse further negotiation
(state i).

2.3

The heuristics of the negotiation strategy

The action decision-making of an AVALANCHE agent’s negotiation strategy is
controlled using 6 trivial parameters with values from a continuous value range
between 0 and 1. These parameters are collectively called the Genotype G. The
particular mechanics of the decision-making process are not required for the
understanding of this article (see [Eyma01a; Eyma01b; Eyma03] for detailed
descriptions).
It is sufficient to generalize by saying that every heuristic strategy, regardless of
the concrete implementation, will choose with a certain probability (as seen by an
outside viewer) either transition ab, ac or ai from Figure 1. If a counteroffer is made, the concession amount is also controlled by the strategy.
Under these circumstances, the goal of the adaptation function is to maximize the
total output by changing the strategy parameters (here: the Genotype). Formally,
this goal can be described as

fU : [ 0,1] → R
6

(2)
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The independent vector ∈ [ 0,1] describes the Genotype of the agent, which is
6

acting in an environment U. The assumption is that a function f (of unknown
shape) exists, which maps the Genotype to its outcome in the realm of natural
numbers, given the current state of U. The goal of learning is thus to maximize the
dependent outcome by optimizing the independent Genotype, which means
adapting single vector elements (dimensions) until the global optimum of fU is
found.
This adaptation task, however, is bound by several restrictions of the environment.
1. No objective, central performance evaluation institution can exist, as this
would require the communication of every agent’s utility function so that a
theoretical optimum can be computed, against which the individual
performance is evaluated. For the same reasons explained in the first chapter of
this article, particularly, size and reach and dynamics of the environment, such
complete evaluation is not realistically possible. The agents will have to
evaluate the effects of their actions on the environment using local information
only.
2. The available data about the performance is historic. The agent merely knows
the average profit from its previous negotiations and can make statements
about the success of the current parameter configuration in relation to previous
parameter configurations on the basis of its development.
3. Because the environment of the agent is highly dynamic, no statement about
the success of a parameter configuration can be made on the basis of one
individual negotiation. The agent must have carried out several negotiations
with a parameter configuration before these can be evaluated by means of the
profit generated.
4. If the other agents also implement adaptation mechanisms, the overall picture
widens to a very complex co-evolution of agents, which is scientifically hard
to evaluate. In this article, co-evolution has thus been ruled out. Only the
middle agents implement machine learning algorithms, while the producers
and consumers are static. However, all agents implement the same heuristics
and start with the same initial Genotype set.

3

The genetic algorithm of Smith and Taylor

The first adaptation mechanism applied is mainly oriented at the evolutionary
algorithm of Smith and Taylor [SmTa98] (STDEA) described in [Eyma01a;
Eyma00]. A fundamental quality of the mechanism is the decentralized
communication and fitness evaluation, using only locally available data.
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Every agent sends one plumage object after a successful transaction, advertising
its average income (fitness) and its genes (genotype) to all agents of the
population after an evaluation phase, i.e. after it has carried out a certain number
of negotiations with this genotype. If an agent receives a plumage object from
another agent, it decides using a blindness probability whether the plumage object
is evaluated, avoiding premature unification of the genotypes. Sender and
recipient remain anonymous. If a certain maturity threshold of received plumages
is exceeded, the agent replaces his old genotype with the evolved version after the
completion of evaluation, selection, recombination and mutation phases as in
normal genetic algorithms. Also influencing the algorithm is the mutation rate,
which determines the frequency and the extent of explorative behaviour of the
population.
The technical functionality of STDEA has been evaluated using the De Jong FiveFunction Test Bed [Gold93]. The performance of agent populations consisting of
either 1 or 25 agents searching for the minimum of the test functions shows that
the algorithm is successful in all functions considered; even one agent alone takes
the right direction. This evaluation has been conducted for all algorithms
described in this article, in order to indicate a correct implementation of the
learning function alone (without heuristics and economic decision-making).
In the AVALANCHE market scenario, STDEA proves to be a reliable optimizing
procedure provided that information is able to flow between the agents. The
parameter to be optimized is the profit (in Figure 2 on the y-axis ) over time (xtime). Figure 2 shows the development of the agent profits on a marketplace with
15 producer agents, 15 consumer agents (both types with non-adapting strategies)
and 15 middleman traders who use the genetic algorithm to optimize their
negotiation result.
In the left half of Figure 2, all producers and consumers have the same unchanging
genotype set; their profits do not change over time and are nearly zero (light grey
dots). However, the middlemen’s profit (black dots) quickly and easily increases
as the (initially same) genotype is optimized. In the right picture, on the other
hand, all agents start with a random genotype. Over time the middlemen gradually
outsmart their non-adapting opponents again and can increase profit at their
expense. However, it should be noted that the exchange of information also
changes the heuristics, as it leads to changed initial negotiation prices and thus
influences the negotiations directly. The outcome of successive evaluations is thus
not as independent as in the De Jong testbed.
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Figure 2: Performance of the genetic algorithm in AVALANCHE scenarios

In STDEA, the middlemen rely on information from other agents of the same type
in the form of the plumage object. Translated to real scenarios, market participants
gather performance information on others e.g. from newspapers, quarterly or
annual reports, market rumours, or intelligence. Without such a “meta information
flow” on the marketplace, economic agents would not be in a position to adapt
their strategy accordingly and therefore incapable of action with regard to the
choice of a strategy. In the next chapter, we thus implement and evaluate
strategies which do not need outside information, but adapt using local feedback.

4

Numerical optimization procedures

“Unfortunately, there is no perfect optimization algorithm. This is a case where we
strongly urge you to try more than one method in comparative fashion.” (Press et.
al. [Pres+02])
The numeric optimizing algorithms applied here are taken in their original form
from Press et al. [Pres+02] and have been slightly altered. The biggest differences
are (1) that the function to be optimized can not be directly evaluated and (2) that
the algorithms are defined to seek the minimum of − fU in the search space [ 0,1] ,
6

to search for the parameter configuration which makes the maximum profit.
The first two algorithms described here belong to the group of the “direction-set
methods”, i.e. they always proceed in two steps. The first step determines the
direction to climb. In the second step, a one-dimensional optimizing sub-algorithm
like Brent’s algorithm or the naïve Golden Section Search [Pres+02] searches for
the extremum.
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Golden Section Search

The one-dimensional Golden Section Search is performed successively along a set
of given directions that are passed through in the same sequence. When searching
for the minimum of the De Jong testbed, this algorithm comes off worse in
relation to the algorithms described in the remainder of this article, which has been
expected. In the AVALANCHE scenario however, this simple algorithm equipped
with the unity vectors does not cut a bad figure (see Figure 3 in comparison with
Figure 2). As all agents process nearly the same market information, the variance
of the development is less even without exchanging information.

Figure 3: Performance of the naive procedure with equivalent genotypes of producers and
consumers

This naive procedure is suitable to examine the significance of individual
parameters for the success of the agent, where the unity vectors are regarded as
direction vectors from the outset. Depending on the contour of the function, this
procedure can, however, be very inefficient when searching for the extremum (see
[Pres+02]). Observations of the development of the profit and the changes of the
parameters attach special importance to the parameter which controls the value of
the initial price offer in this particular AVALANCHE-based example. The
applicability of this simple procedure to realistic heuristics thus requires cautious
implementation and further research.

4.2

Multi-dimensional optimization according to Powell

The direction set method of Powell in [Pres+02] not only searches for the
extremum but also for optimal directions for the one-dimensional sub-algorithm in
order to accelerate the search procedure. Powell’s procedure thereby derives a
number of conjugated vectors from the extrema found in the respective directions.
The algorithm implemented here tries to handle the problem of the linear
dependence of these vectors through a heuristic process. After each optimization
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cycle, the optimal direction is replaced with the one which has generated the
greatest progress.
As a proven and very efficient optimization procedure, Powell’s procedure
delivers a quick outcome in the De Jong testbed. In the AVALANCHE setting, this
procedure also achieves better results than the genetic algorithm. Since Powell’s
procedure also searches for dimensional directions to take on the way to the
extremum, this method offers the possibility of examining connections between
the individual parameters and their significance for the choice of a strategy in
small populations.

Figure 4: Performance of Powell’s procedure with equivalent genotypes of producers and
consumers

However, if one conveys this result of one individual agent to a population of
agents, in which each agent has to carry out its own search process, the number of
the required evaluations multiplies with the number of the agents until each agent
has reached an acceptable result. The larger the population, the lower thus the
performance, which is considered to make this mechanism impractical for realworld scenarios.

4.3

The Simplex method according to Nelder and Meat

Nelder and Meat’s method [Pres+02] does not require an one-dimensional subalgorithm. At the outset, linear independent points with their functional values,
spanning an n-dimensional subspace, are located in an n+1-dimensional search
space. This geometric figure is described as a simplex. The starting point of an
optimizing step is the point of the simplex with the worst functional value. This
point is transferred through heuristic reflections to the hyperplane, defined by the
remaining n points, into a point with better functional value, whereby the property
of the n+1 points to form a simplex remains.
In the De Jong testbed the performance decreases with the growing number of
agents, as in the other numeric optimizing procedures. In AVALANCHE, the results
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in the scenarios with unified genotypes of producers and consumers are, compared
to the first two procedures, exceptionally good.

Figure 5: Performance of the Simplex method with one or 15 agents on the marketplace at a
time

Summarizing for the numerical procedures, Powell’s algorithm as well as the
Simplex method provides better results than the GSS algorithm regarding the test
functions as well as AVALANCHE. The differences to the (parallel processing)
STDEA become obvious if one varies the size of the population. In the case of a
single agent, the numeric algorithms take advantage of their directed search, in
contrast to the random exploration of the STDEA, which performs better with an
increasing number of agents.

5

A hybrid genetic algorithm on the basis of the VID
model according to Brenner

In the preceding chapters, algorithms were based on two different principles. The
genetic algorithm STDEA is based on random exploration combined with
imitation, while the numeric algorithms are based on directed exploration. The
following hybrid algorithm OVID combines both approaches. It tries to mirror
human acquisition of information that is driven by imitation, random exploration,
and exploration directed by cognitive processes. Technically, a parallelized
version of the Simplex method is extended by the STDEA with respect to random
exploration.
The VID (Variation-Imitation-Decision) model according to Brenner [Bren96;
Bren02] is based on hypotheses from cognitive psychology and satisficing theory
[Simo87] and combines them to a learning process for repetitive decision
processes. “It assumes that decision-makers learn from their experience, are
motivated to behavioural changes by unsatisfactory actions and are able to imitate
successful strategies of others” [Bren02]. VID correlates (positive feedback)
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experience, contentment and the basic willingness to exploitative and explorative
behaviour by individually (1) calculating the probability to change from one
behaviour to another without any influence of other individuals, and (2)
calculating the probability to imitate the strategy of another individual.
In this article, the assumptions of the VID model have been slightly altered. The
limited information processing capacity of the AVALANCHE agents does not allow
them to hold models of all agents’ strategies. The adaptation of the Genotype
draws from a continuous interval of possible actions, while the original VID
model assumes a discrete number of actions. Thus the following questions remain:
which information can be used to quantify the agent’s satisfaction and experience?
How can the motivation for adapting the strategy be derived from the satisfaction?
How can imitations or variations be realized in a continuous action space?
Quantification of the experience. The experience value compares the performance
of a particular agent to that of all other agents. This comparison (using publicly
available data about all agent’s strategies) provides the basis for imitation in the
original VID model. The strategy with the highest experience value witnessed will
be imitated by the comparing agent in order to increase his own performance.
Since the agents in AVALANCHE only possess information about their current
parameter configuration, the procedure already known from the genetic algorithm
is an alternative for direct information transfer: the agents send a plumage object
to all agents of the population or of the market and process plumage objects from
other agents only with a certain degree of probability. As the experience
performance with a certain Genotype is correlated with an agent’s profit, the
experience value for an agent can be directly calculated by putting a received
plumage’s fitness profitav in relation to the perceived average fitness values of
other agents profitav , all .

experienceav =

profitav - profitav , all
profitav , all

(3)

Quantification of the satisfaction. The satisfaction value is correlated with
adaptation of the current own strategy. Here, the agent compares its past and
current performance without looking to outside strategies.
Due to limited computational abilities, the agent can merely correlate the
functional value or profit of the current parameter configuration to a previously
generated average profit. This value is identified as aspiration level, as the
satisfaction of the agent sensibly stands in proportion to the profit development. If
the profits rise, the value of the satisfaction is positive, if the profits fall, it is
negative. Analogous to the quantification of the experience, the satisfaction is
related here to the percentage change of the profit. However, the significance of
the success of an individual negotiation can not be determined; the value is thus
derived by comparison to several negotiations carried out in succession.
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profitav − profitav ,old
profitav ,old
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(4)

In the notation following [Bren96]:

si ( t ) =

uav ( I i ( t ) , t ) − uav ( I i ( t − τ ) , t − τ )
uav ( I i ( t ) , t )

(5)

where as

uav ( I i (t ) , t ) = profitav ( I i (t ) , t )
n

= ∑ ζ sj × (1 − ζ s ) × profit ( I i (t ) , t )

(6)

j =0

= ζ s × uav ( I i (t − 1) , t − 1) + (1 − ζ s ) × u ( I i (t ) , t )
Motivation for behavioural change. If the satisfaction falls below zero, the current
strategy shows inferior performance and the motivation to change the strategy
1
with infimum 0 and
rises. This can be described using a Sigmoid curve
1 + e ax + b
supremum 1, where m ( 0, t ) is the basic motivation if satisfaction = 0. The
motivation for the behaviour change should at least be the basic motivation in the
case of negative profit.

1

uav ( I i ( t ) , t ) ≥ 0

1 + e a ( t )× s ( t ) + β
m ( s (t ) , t ) = 
1

max 
, m ( 0, t )  uav ( I i ( t ) , t ) < 0

a ( t )× s ( t ) + β

1+ e


(7)

where as




1
− 1
 m ( 0, t ) 

β = log 

(8)

Let α be calculable through the value to the point

−0.5 uav ( I i ( t ) , t ) ≥ 0
x=
 −1 uav ( I i ( t ) , t ) < 0
given through the parameter 0 < µ + , µ − < 1 as

(9)
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 µ + × (1 − m ( 0, t ) ) + m ( 0, t ) uav ( I i ( t ) , t ) ≥ 0
m ( x, t ) = 
 µ − × (1 − m ( 0, t ) ) + m ( 0, t ) uav ( I i ( t ) , t ) < 0

(10)

From this follows

 1

ln 
− 1 − β
m ( x, t ) 
α (t ) = 
x

(11)

The value calculated in formula (11) at point x indicates with what probability the
agent adapts his behaviour when his profit is half as high or doubly loss-making as
the previously generated profit. The parameter µ + and µ − determine this value in
relation to the basic motivation.
Partial imitation. In the process of imitation in [Bren96], a strategy regarded as
successful will be copied without changes. In genetic algorithms, this relates to a
crossover of the current genotype with the most successful genotype, where only
the alien genotype prevails. Subsequent mutation is optional.
Directed variation. In [Bren96] the behaviour variation is an undirected
exploration, which selects a strategy at random. In order to give the explorative
behaviour a direction in a meaningful way, analogous to human cognitive
perception, a parallelized Simplex method will be used to process information
from other agents. Each choice of a strategy, defined by a certain genotype
parameter configuration, is mapped to a point in the n-dimensional search space of
the Simplex process.
The results of this optimizing VID (OVID) mechanism show a better performance
overall than both genetic algorithms and numerical mechanisms alone.
In comparison to the numerical procedures described in chapter 4, the
performance in the De Jong Testbed with a population of 25 agents is better; but it
does not reach the performance of the genetic algorithm STDEA. In one particular
test function f 5 , however, the OVID method does not lose the direction to the
minimum in contrast to the genetic algorithm, which operates at random.
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Figure 6: Performance of OVID each with one or 15 equally initialized agents on the
marketplace

Figure 6 shows the price developments in the AVALANCHE setting with uniform
genotypes of producers and consumers each with one and 15 agents. In the
experiment in Figure 7, the information flow was disrupted and thus the learning
process is slower.

Figure 7: Performance of OVID without information flow between the agents (on the left)
and with random initialization (on the right)

The OVID model presents a possibility of combining the advantages of the genetic
algorithm STDEA, the numeric optimization procedure of the Simplex method
and the imitating and directed exploring behaviour of human cognitive processes.
This algorithm does also not depend on a constant information flow between the
agents, but can meaningfully evaluate such at any time. It is thus more robust than
STDEA and yields better results than pure numerical optimization approaches.
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Conclusions and further work

This paper has shown a comparison of different optimization algorithms for profit
maximization of negotiating software agents in e-commerce scenarios. These were
implemented and tested in a particular multiagent system, using different numbers
of agents and different parameterization of the negotiation partner. While the
genetic algorithm STDEA and the numeric optimization methods already produce
good results, it was possible to combine their strengths to develop the OVID
procedure. This learning mechanism is considered efficient within large and also
mixed populations. It can meaningfully use information from other agents;
however, it does not depend on it.
The algorithms are still to be tested with regard to their behaviour (1) on
marketplaces with varying population size and (2) where the negotiation partners
are also equipped with a learning algorithm and therefore the optimizing
procedures co-evolve. In such a scenario it is expected that the information about
the success of parameter configurations lose significance. In the static scenarios
described here, merely the development of the price concepts and varying starting
points of the negotiations as well as stochastic irregularities caused differing
results with one and the same parameter configuration.
What is also missing, of course, is the evaluation of the learning mechanisms in a
real-world scenario. If the findings of this article can be transferred has yet to be
shown. As an example, the business performance information published in real
markets has shown to be sometimes inexact, incorrect or even completely made
up. Even if this behaviour could be taken into account if reputation tracking
mechanisms as in [Eyma+02] are applied, which modify the raw data prior to
including it in the learning process, the question arises how this again would
influence the performance of different learning mechanisms.
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